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Introduction

The great aim and end of civil society is protection of the persons and properties of
individuals by an equal contribution to whatever is necessary to attain and secure it. For,
since all the individuals who compose the union are to partake of its protection, and of
every other benefit resulting from it; nothing can be more just than that the expences,
burthens, and sacrifices, necessary to preserve it, should be equally distributed and
proportionably sustained by all [sic].1

Eminent domain, or the taking of private property for the greater good, has been one of
the most frequently cited topics in scholarship on the development of American law in the
nineteenth-century. Legal historians such as Morton J. Horowitz, Harry N. Scheiber, James
Willard Hurst, Kermit L. Hall, and Lawrence M. Friedman have clearly illustrated the
significance of eminent domain and its role in the development of American society. Historians
have suggested that eminent domain was initially utilized by the state to take private property for
purposes of internal development—the building or widening of roads, canal construction, and the
laying of railroad tracks. In the early nineteenth century, however, the power of eminent
domain, traditionally a power of the state, was devolved upon individually owned corporations.
When this authority was granted to corporations, it was as if the corporations, rather than the
states, gained the sovereignty and authorization to expropriate land as needed. While the courts
were still used when corporations were confronted with stubborn property owners who slowed
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what was supposed to be an expedited process, corporations began to exercise the power that
state legislatures once held. As a result of this transferal of power, the institution of eminent
domain flourished within America.2
The key assumption that has led historians to base most of their analyses on the
nineteenth century and the cause of internal development is that the overall position of
legislators, justices, and businessmen tended towards the protection of capital and the
preservation of potentially productive land.3 Thus, the taking of privately owned land under
eminent domain law has been intimately linked to the development and growth of capitalism in
the Unites States. This fact has led historians to utilize eminent domain as an avenue for
explaining why actions taken in “the name of vested rights had less to do with protecting
[private] holdings,” as was considered by many to be the most basic purpose of law, “than it had
to do with protecting [public] ventures.”4
Given the numerous analyses of eminent domain in nineteenth-century America, one may
wonder what role this legal device played in late-eighteenth-century or post-revolutionary
America. In his Bancroft Prize winning analysis of the development of American law, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, Horowitz even considered the fact that “given the
central role that eminent domain played in legal controversy during the nineteenth century, it is
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rather surprising to see how infrequently it arose as a legal question before that time.”5 But
Horowitz makes a critical error when he assumes that questions and legal disputes involving
eminent domain or governmental takings were relatively uncommon prior to the nineteenthcentury. He assumes the early state governments did not utilize eminent domain solely because
the term ‘eminent domain’ does not appear in the sources. This is simply not the case.
The right of a sovereign power to confiscate an individual’s property was not an
innovation of nineteenth-century American law. The nineteenth-century American law of
eminent domain is only one episode in the continuous development of a sovereign’s power to
regulate property that can be identified as far back as the eighth-century BCE. This study will
suggest that eminent domain, though not necessarily classified as such, was a significant factor in
the development of America in the years following the Declaration of Independence and the
conclusion of a successful revolution.
My dissertation will be divided into six sections—a brief history of state takings, the
cause of the Loyalists, the abolition of entail, internal development prior to the nineteenth
century, Indian removal, and the abolition of slavery. The discussion of these causes within the
context of the developing understanding of eminent domain will provide evidence that indicates
that a reassessment of eminent domain and state takings is in order. While eminent domain has
largely been understood as an artifact of the process of internal development and
industrialization, eminent domain also needs to be recognized as an artifact of the independence
movement and the building process of the state. Today I would like to present the case of the
Loyalists.
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Cause of the Loyalists

In times of such commotion as the present, while the passions of men are worked up to an
uncommon pitch there is great danger of fatal extremes…Irregularities I know are to be
expected, but they are nevertheless dangerous and ought to be checked, by every prudent
and moderate mean.6

Out of all of the founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton best understood the unjust and
disturbing nature of the governmental and popular actions against those colonists who remained
neutral or loyal to the British Crown during the revolution. Whether this was the result of his
being born outside of the British North American colonies or his living in a colony that claimed
one of the highest loyalist populations, it is clear that he was uncomfortable with the many acts
of legislation and popular publications made against this loathed cohort. Hamilton was not,
however, against the suppression of the Tories and their attempts to rally support for their cause.
But he was, as a man well versed in the law and legal theory, in favor of remedying the loyalist
problem through legal means that were not overtly injurious to their former brethren.7
Ideally, the problem of the loyalists was supposed to be resolved through the definitive
peace treaty signed by British and American representatives in September of 1783 in Paris.
Unfortunately, while two of the ten articles explicitly dealt with the issue of loyalists in America,
only one of them left no room for interpretation. Article VI unquestionably states that no future
confiscations or injuries may be committed against anyone who was thought to have been
associated with the enemy at any point during the war.8 Article V, while much more lengthy
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than Article VI, exhibits many loopholes that could be and often times were easily exploited by
individual state governments.
The intent of Article V of the Treaty of Paris was to see the properties of those British
subjects who did not take up arms against the patriots returned to their owners. The article
requests that Congress “earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective states” to
allow British subjects to remain in the colonies up to “twelve months, unmolested in their
endeavours [sic] to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights and properties as may
have been confiscated.”9 While Congress could suggest that the states uphold the sentiment
expressed in the treaty, the ultimate control over confiscated property rested in the hands of
thirteen individual state governments—many of the same state governments that were in debt
following a very costly war.10
As J. Franklin Jameson has illustrated in his landmark lecture series The American
Revolution Considered as a Social Movement, states that previously housed large Tory
populations sought to gain a great deal of hard currency from confiscating the estates of the
perceived traitors. Even the states that were home only to one or two large loyalist estates would

against any person or persons, for or by reason of the past which he or they may have taken in the present war; and
that no person shall, on that account, suffer any future loss or damage either in his person, liberty or property; and
that those who may be in confinement on such charges at the time of the ratification of the treaty in America, shall
be immediately set at liberty, and the prosecutions so commenced be discontinued.
9

Ibid.

10

Under the Articles of Confederation, the war debts were to be compiled into what was known as
“common charges.” When the “common charges” were completely totaled, each individual state would be assessed
its share of the debt according to land value. See E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of
American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 203-219. For
an in depth analysis of how each state attempted to pay their debts, see Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic:
Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins of the Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 53138.

have benefited from such confiscation acts.11 As a result, each state fashioned its own laws
regarding the confiscation of loyalist property that would best suit both its social and fiscal
needs. Prior to 1783 and the passage of the Treaty of Paris, the laws passed by each state were
justifiable under the law of nations. As Hugo Grotius suggested in 1625 in his study The Rights
of War and Peace, in times of war it was just to punish anyone who was believed to be
committing treason against the authorities. Who better fit this characterization than the loyalists?
In the eyes of the patriots, the loyalists not only refused to join the rebel alliance, but also acted
out against their former colonial brethren.
New York was one of the first states to begin passing legislation intended to
disenfranchise the loyalists. By examining the legislation of New York, the reactions to the
confiscation process, and its relationship to the concept of government takings, it will be possible
to discern that the power of eminent domain was not always utilized for purposes of
improvement. In the case of the loyalists, the state clearly utilized its authority over
expropriation to punish those who did not fall in line with the rebellion against Britain.
As early as 1775, the legislature of New York began passing laws that were described by
the editor of a pamphlet published in London as thoroughly “Vindictive [in] Spirit.”12 Thomas
Jones, a lawyer and representative of the loyalist cause, attested to this description, finding that
the most prevalent loyalist complaint focused on the idea that the government, under military
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control, was confiscating loyalist property for their own “ease, pleasure, diversion, and
emolument.” Furthermore, there were no courts that would hear their cases except for those
“arbitrary, illegal, despotic, and unconstitutional Courts, called ‘Courts of Police.’”13
By 1783, however, the position of the loyalists had changed—the war was officially over
and the Treaty of Paris was enacted. No longer was it justifiable for the state legislature to
expropriate and destroy loyalist property. When the definitive treaty was signed between the
United States and Great Britain and Congress recommended that the states take Article V into
full consideration, the obstinate Senate and House of New York State refused to cede any ground
to the loyalists who were stripped of their property at the start of the revolution. In the opinion
of the New York legislature, it was the behavior of the loyalists who lived within the state that
took actions, not the laws, which could be viewed as anything but vengeful. The loyalists had
“cruelly massacred without Regard to Age or Sex, many of our [New York’s] Citizens, and
wantonly desolated, and laid Waste, a great Part of this State,” and, therefore, could never have
their rights of citizenship restored.14
But how seriously should these moral and righteous defenses of the legislation previously
passed and refusal to enforce Article V of the Treaty of Paris be taken? Did not the patriots also
participate in the destruction of property, particularly the property belonging to their perceived
enemies, throughout the revolution? Were not many loyalists also “reduced to Poverty and
Distress” as a result of patriot actions? Were the patriots simply rationalizing their extra-legal
actions? James Rivington, a loyalist printer, for example, suffered a great deal at the hands of
patriots such as Isaac Sears, John Lamb, and Marinus Willett. The destruction of Rivington’s
printing apparatuses in 1775 and eventual forced suspension of his presses on December 12,
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1783, should not be considered any differently than the suggested actions of the loyalists.15
Property of loyalists and patriots should not be considered as two separate entities. Alexander
Hamilton, while no supporter of Rivington, found the actions of the Sons of Liberty against him
to be particularly egregious.
It cannot be sufficiently supported, then, that the legislature of New York had such pure
motives as avenging the destruction of property within the state; if this were indeed the case,
then extra-legal actions would not have been taken against the loyalists. There is, however,
evidence in support of the state utilizing its authority to expropriate and refuse to restore the
property of the loyalists in order to raise funds. The law passed by the House and Senate of New
York in 1784 entitled “An Act for the Speedy Sale of the confiscated and forfeited Estates within
this State, and for other Purposes therein mentioned” exemplifies this motive.
This purpose of this act was to direct how the property confiscated by the state from the
loyalists “should be sold and converted into Money, and otherwise applied for sinking and
discharging the public Securities.”16 However, on May 12, 1784, Gouverneur Morris delivered a
message from the Council of Revisions expressing objection to the motion that “An Act for the
Speedy Sale of the confiscated and forfeited Estates…” become a law of the state. The Council
of Revisions believed that the act was “inconsistent with the Public Good.”17 Recall that the
states authority to confiscate property was premised upon the notion that it was being taken for
the ‘good of the community’.
The Council of Revisions believed that this act was contrary to the public good based on
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two principle objections: Firstly, they believed that placing the sole power to “sell and dispose
of all Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments and Real Estate” within the hands of seven
Commissioners of Forfeiture who had the power to convey and execute deeds that would be
good in law was a mistake. Giving seven men the ability to regulate all the confiscated property
within the state without any checks on their power would leave the state helpless if they should
abuse their position through any type of misconduct.18 Secondly, they believed it was not lawful
to accept the certificates issued to the inhabitants of the state by the Continental Loan Officer as
payment for property within the state since the certificates were representative of the national
debt, not the debt of New York alone. Similarly to that of the possibility of corruption within the
Commissioners of Forfeiture, the council believed that in accepting certificates issued by the
United States, they would be “open[ing] a Door to fresh Frauds, and giv[ing] a certain Disguise
and Covering to past ones.”19
In spite of the objections of the Council of Revisions, the Senate affirmed that the act
should become a law of the state. With the affirmation of the House, the act became an official
law of New York despite the fact that everyone was not in agreement that it was in the best
interest of the public and that Congress had urged the states to seriously consider returning
confiscated estates to their former owners. The process of proposing, attempting to revise, and
passing this act illustrates not only divisions caused by the subject of loyalists and the seizing of
their property, but also that many legislators were both thinking and writing within the guidelines
of eminent domain that were expressed in Emerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations.20 However,
18

Ibid., 43, 169.

19

Ibid., 170.

20

Joseph Galloway, representative of the loyalist cause, also distinguished in the appendix to his work The
Claim of the American Loyalists that the British Minister who worked on the peace treaty suggested that he had no
other option but to submit to the notion that the confiscated property was “given up as the price and purchase of the

the critiques offered by the Council of Revisions in relation to this act were not the only
dissension expressed against the rather oppressive laws that New York State instituted against
loyalists.
In 1783, prior to the passage of “An Act for the Speedy Sale of the confiscated and
forfeited Estates…,” the Board of American Loyalists issued a tract which clearly outlined all of
the reasons why the state legislatures were wrong for denying indemnification for the loyalist
property that was taken. The central argument made in this publication is clearly stated. While
the board concedes that the acts passed by the states “are justifiable under the fundamental law of
eminent domain,” he contends, utilizing the authority of Samuel von Pufendorf, that restitution
must also be made for their individual sacrifices for the general safety of the public.21 What is
further, according to most jurists and political theorists who wrote treatises on the law of eminent
domain, even when “a prince is compelled, by necessity, to alienate in a treaty a part of his
dominions, the losses of individuals, whose fortunes are sacrificed to the national safety, must be
made good by the nation.”22
The Board of American Loyalists defend their claims even further against the belief that
no person who committed treasonous acts against the newly formed government should have
their property returned or receive compensation for their property. Numerous examples of the
governments representing the side of the winning country replacing the government of the losing
country are provided. After the war between Spain and what became the independent States of
Holland, anyone who had lost more than their fair share of property in the name of the public
peace.” One of the most frequently described aspects of eminent domain is the notion that subjects must be willing
to surrender their property when it is in the best interest of the nation, in this case, the British nation. See Joseph
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good would have their estates restored to them or receive a monetary compensation. The Treaty
of Utrecht signed at the conclusion of Queen Anne’s War provided for the return of two
prominent families estates. Perhaps most closely related to the situation of the loyalists is the
treatment of French inhabitants of Canada after it was ceded to Britain during the Seven Years
War. French inhabitants who would not become subjects of Britain were given complete access
to dispose of their property or move it in a timely manner to French territory.23
Although the argument may be made that since loyalists remained subjects of the British
Crown, it should be the British nation, not the American nation that should be responsible for
restorations. The fact that British representatives did require the inclusion of Articles V and VI
in the definitive treaty indicates that the British government did make arrangements for
restoration of loyalist property and that the United States Government voluntarily took the power
of compensation into their own hands. Unfortunately, as many letters of Alexander Hamilton
indicate, not only did the states refuse to take Article V into consideration, but many legislatures,
and in Hamilton’s case the New York legislature, actively ignored the Article VI, which ordered
the mandatory cessation of the seizure of loyalist estates. In Hamilton’s opinion, this refusal to
comply with both articles in the Treaty of Paris created much more danger than that posed by the
loyalists. In a letter to George Clinton, Hamilton suggests that if the states continue to ignore
certain aspects of the treaty, the possibility of renewed warfare may become a reality:
In the eye of a foreign nation, if our engagements are broken, it is of no moment whether
it is for the want of good intention in the government or for want of power to restrain its
subjects. Suppose a violence committed by an American vessel on the vessel of another
nation upon the high seas and after complaint made, there is no redress given. Is not that
a hostility against the injured nation which will justify reprisals?24
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Not only does the refusal of state governments to return the property of loyalists or
compensate them in another fashion seemingly undermine the laws regulating the power of
eminent domain, but the refusal also undermines the laws of nature and nations. However, there
is also another major issue that the state governments speak to through both their unwillingness
to compensate the loyalists and cease hostilities against the estates of those who remained—
sovereignty. The state governments seem to be claiming sovereignty in the mere act of
exercising the right to expropriate and regulate property. But they are also undermining the
national governments position of sovereignty over the power of making treaties with other
nations.

